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Chapter 4 
 
INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS AND DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE 
OF THE REGULATORIN THE IRISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REGULATORY ARRANGEMENT (10,101 WORDS, 39 P.) 
 
Muiris MacCarthaigh1 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As with the other jurisdictions considered in this volume, the Irish state’s administrative 
apparatus has performed a variety of social and economic regulatory functions for many 
years. A rapid and comparatively recent increase in the use of independent national 
regulatory agencies (NRAs) between 1990 and 2010, however, increased the complexity 
of the Irish regulatory environment and presented new governance and co-ordination 
challenges. The work and organisation of these new NRAs have been strongly influenced 
not only by the EU and domestic actors such as the courts, but also by the Irish politico-
administrative regime and culture. Drawing on an analysis of the Irish regulatory 
arrangement for telecommunications, the focus of this chapter is on the primary Irish 
telecoms regulator – ComReg – and in particular how the use of informal powers and 
influence have been deployed to meet the challenges of regulating a rapidly-changing 
policy sector. 
2 
 Beginning with a brief theoretical examination of the role of informality in 
bureaucracy, the chapter proceeds by suggesting that informality can be considered along 
two dimensions, namely, discretionary behaviour and involvement in networks 
respectively. Following this, a description of the Irish politico-administrative system and 
the background to the liberalization and regulation of the telecommunications sector is 
presented. As part of this analysis, the actors in the regulatory environment and the 
formal and informal relationships between them are mapped. Adopting an analysis 
founded on original and secondary sources, the chapter finds that as well as the formal 
regulatory arrangement, telecoms regulation in Ireland continues to be strongly informed 
and characterized by informality and informal relationships. 
 
4.2The role of informality and informal relationships within 
bureaucracies 
It is well documented that within small states public administration organizations and 
public servants must develop increased capacity to multi-task (Katzenstein 1985; Baker 
1992; Randma-Liiv 2002). This is particularly the case for those states in the Anglo-
Saxon administrative tradition, where the generalist system of recruitment and 
appointment allows for considerable mobility of bureaucrats between tasks as priorities 
change, and a demonstrated capacity to successfully undertake different roles is 
frequently a requirement for career advancement. The size of the bureaucracy and 
political system in small states also determines that personal contacts are valued 
professionally, and it is comparatively easy for public servants to communicate directly 
through informal personal contacts and networks across the administrative system. 
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 Alongside the role played by scale in determining the manner in which an 
administrative system operates is the type of organizational culture which exists within it. 
Organizational culture is concerned with the informal norms and values that are 
important for the activities of organizations (cf. Scott 2001; Christensen et al. 2007). 
What makes an action appropriate in a certain organization is a normative and 
institutional foundation that varies across organizations depending on how their 
respective cultures have evolved, and what its dominant norms and values are. Therefore, 
while all bureaucratic systems are concerned with legality and formal rule-following, 
there will be some variation across bureaucratic systems in the degree to which their 
organisational culture also tolerates the use of informal methods for communicating and 
ensuring the performance of tasks (cf. Hofstede 2001). 
 In the Irish case, which is the focus of this chapter, organizational culture within 
the bureaucracy has traditionally placed an emphasis on the avoidance of conflict and 
problem solving through the use of informal channels and networks2. Such networking 
also provides a means for overcoming departmentalism and reducing transaction costs, as 
well as developing trust and shared identity through frequent interaction and exchange. A 
review of the Irish public service by the OECD in 2008 noted that ‘the Irish Public 
Service is already rich with informal networks that reflect the small size of the country 
and of the Public Service’ and that ‘Ireland is a small country with informal ties between 
departments and agencies, and between politicians and citizens’ (OECD 2008: 44, 229). 
Thus informality is recognized as a defining characteristic of the Irish administrative 
system and supported as a modus operandi. 
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 Given its potential range of application, however, the concept of informality is 
inherently problematic to theorise or model. Misztal defines it in sociological terms as ‘a 
form of interaction among partners enjoying relative freedom in interpretation of their 
roles’ requirements’ (2000:8). By contrast Helmke and Levitsky view the concept more 
narrowly by looking at informality in institutional terms, defining it as ‘socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially 
sanctioned channels’ (2006: 5). In policy terms, informality could range from the actual 
setting aside of formal rules in the pursuit of objectives, for example, to the development 
of standard procedures where none exist. Informality can even be conceptualized as 
simply corruption or participation in illegal activities, networks or relationships. This 
latter view, for example, has long been of interest to political scientists concerned with 
how informal behaviour can undermine formal institutions. For the purposes of this 
paper, however, we consider informality more narrowly and along two related 
dimensions: the use of discretion in the implementation of policy, and the engagement of 
actors in non-formal (but rule-bound) networks and communications. 
 In relation to the first dimension, the use of discretionary behaviour by 
bureaucrats when making decisions, and particularly those at ‘street level’, is a well-
rehearsed concern in administrative law (cf. Lipsky 1980; Hawkins 1992). To its 
proponents, it is an accepted means of blunting the potentially harsh nature of pure 
rational law. In this perspective, informality includes the extension of autonomy to 
bureaucrats to implement a law in accordance with principles established in a political 
arena for that law, and based on values deemed appropriate to the public interest. By 
definition, this is a discretion enjoyed by most regulators in performing their standard-
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setting and decision-making roles, and is of particular importance in rapidly changing 
policy sectors which cannot be regulated by strict legislative interpretation alone. 
 In relation to the second dimension, the concern is the capacity of actors (or in 
this case regulatory authorities), to engage in a variety of non-formal networks and 
personal communications, and to use their informational and resource advantages within 
such networks in the pursuit of their remit. This is in keeping with Hood’s (1983) seminal 
identification of Nodality (or positioning within a network) as a generic type of 
instruments utilized by governments to fulfil tasks (the others being Authority, Treasure 
and Organization). In this perspective, an organization can exercise not alone its formal 
authority but also any opportunities for discretionary engagement in networks. Such 
networks can typically emerge organically in response to particular needs and issues, and 
though informal in nature, each member is bound by their respective organizations’ rules. 
 At first glance, the suggestion of engagement in informal networks or 
communications may appear unusual in a regulatory setting where transparency is central 
to market and stakeholder confidence. However the importance of culture, informality 
and interdependent relations between actors in determining a regulatory regime were key 
findings of the study by Hall et al (2000) of the British telecommunications regime. In 
that case, they found that the incumbent operator was able to exert formal and informal 
influence on the regulator, and recorded the close monitoring by the parent Ministry of 
the regulator’s activities in spite of the formal separation of jurisdictions. They concluded 
that these factors were as important as instrumental considerations in shaping the 
regulator’s decision-making processes. 
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 The use of such informal methods in order to engage and persuade others (or 
more specifically regulatees) is also consistent with the less interventionist enforcement 
methods identified by Ayres and Braithwaite in their scheme of regulatory enforcement 
(1992: 35). In a pyramidal model, they identify negotiated and self-regulatory modes of 
regulation (at the base of the pyramid) as most desirable form, but recognize that it is 
only likely to occur in the presence of the threat of imposed external regulation – the apex 
of the regulatory ‘enforcement pyramid’. Thus informal communications and 
engagements can support effective self-regulating regimes, and reduce the need for the 
more litigious ‘adversarial legalism’ which Kagan (2001) describes as permeating the 
American regulatory and policy process. Non-formal networks can therefore be utilized 
successfully within legal and constitutional frameworks to support rather than undermine 
the achievement of formal tasks and objectives. And as will be demonstrated in the case-
study below, as well as remaining subsidiary to formal processes, informal practices and 
networks can also be formalized once their utility becomes accepted and established. To 
elaborate on these themes, we turn here to consider the emergence of the Irish telecoms 
regulatory regime, and in particular to extent to which informality has played a role in its 
development. 
 
4.3 The Irish administrative system and the liberalisation and 
regulation of telecommunications 
The Republic of Ireland (hereafter Ireland) is a unitary state of 4.5 million people 
employing a system of representative parliamentary democracy. It has a legal tradition of 
the public interest model with its roots in the English common law system. Irish law 
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(including administrative law) draws on a combination of the 1937 Constitution, EU law, 
statute law and judicial decisions. The core units of administrative organization are 
government departments staffed by civil servants, of which there are normally fifteen, 
each headed by a government Minister including the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). These 
ministers, along with a small number of office holders, collectively form the Cabinet 
which normally meets weekly and is the principal decision-making body in the state. 
Ireland adheres to a doctrine of ministerial accountability to parliament, and in theory all 
public organisations are primarily held politically accountable to parliament via the 
Minister responsible for their ‘parent’ department. 
 As a former British colony, the Irish administrative system shares many features 
in common with the Whitehall system, in which the civil service is generalist and 
explicitly non-political, with civil servants precluded from joining political parties 
(Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2009). Traditionally, the role of top civil servants has been 
to provide impartial advice and policy options to government, though in practice a wider 
range of actors are involved. There is considerable emphasis on cooperation at the 
political-administrative interface and resignations of senior civil servants (and Ministers) 
are rare. Ireland remains close to the model of career-based recruitment to the 
bureaucracy, and traditionally there have been very few external appointments to its more 
senior levels, preserving a relatively conservative administrative culture with shared 
norms and values. 
 In relation to the telecommunications sector, and in line with broader questioning 
of monopolist structures at the European level, the Irish Government took its first steps 
towards liberalization of the telecoms market in the 1980s. Under the terms of the Postal 
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& Telecommunications Services Act 1983,responsibility for provision of the Irish state’s 
postal and telecommunications services were transferred from the Department of Posts 
and Telegraphs (which had existed since 1924) to two newly-created state enterprises – 
An Post and Bord Telecom Éireann. Both came into being on the 1 January 1984. In this 
first step the telecommunications market was corporatized but not liberalized: both 
companies still held monopoly positions in the postal and telecommunications markets 
respectively, and their Boards were answerable to the Minister as shareholder. Bord 
Telecom Éireann created a subsidiary company called Eircell in 1984, which developed 
Ireland’s first mobile telephone network in 1986, and later its first digital (GSM) network 
in 1993. Simultaneously, a new Department of Communications was created. This 
Department assumed responsibility for the remaining functions of the Department of 
Posts and Telegraphs as well as the Department of Transport, which were both abolished. 
 During the 1990s, successive Irish governments sought to open up electronic 
communications networks and services to promote competition with a view to improving 
Ireland’s economic competitiveness by upgrading Ireland’s communications network. 
The first steps in the liberalization process in Ireland were taken as a result of the 1988 
EU Terminal Equipment Directive (88/301/EEC). Services other than the public 
provision of voice telephony were subsequently opened to the market in 1990, under 
influence of Directives 90/387 CE (Open Network Provision Directive, the so-called 
ONP directive) and 90/388 CE (on competition provisions). The Leased Lines Directive 
(Council Directive 92/44/EEC) obliged Member States to provide applicants with a 
minimum and equal set of leased lines for use or resale from 5 June 1993 onwards 
(Massey and Shorthall 1999). 
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 In 1994, prompted by these developments at European level, a 
Telecommunications Strategy Group was established by the Irish Government to examine 
the telecommunications sector in Ireland and to advise it on the establishment of an 
independent regulatory agency for the sector. The report of this Group led to the creation 
in Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation (ODTR). In March 1996, the 
Commission (under the terms of Commission Directive 96/19/EC) removed all remaining 
restrictions on competition in telecommunications services, and the telecommunications 
market was opened up to full competition on 1 January 1998. 
 Ireland sought and achieved a partial derogation from the Directive (which 
interviews reveal was supported by the incumbent operator) until 1 January 2000. This 
was necessary in respect of the proposed liberalization of voice telephony services which 
required considerable restructuring within Telecom Éireann, as well as more general 
development of Ireland’s telecommunications network. It was also necessary to put in 
place a licensing framework for new operators, a fair telephone numbering system and to 
review the rights and obligations governing interconnection between (the former 
monopolist) Eircom's telecommunications network and the facilities of other operators. In 
the event, this work was expedited quickly and the ending of this derogation was brought 
forward to 1 December 1998. 
 In advance of the full telecoms market liberalization in Ireland, on the 30 
November 1998 the Director of Telecommunications Regulation awarded twenty-nine 
new telecommunications licenses. Also prior to liberalization, in the case of mobile 
telephony, Telecom Eireann’s monopoly was ended when a second GSM mobile operator 
(ESAT Digifone) was introduced in 1996 following public competition organized by the 
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then Department of Public Enterprise3, and a third (Meteor) in 1998. In 1999 Telecom 
Éireann was privatised by way of a public share offering, and its name changed to 
Eircom. Though its ownership has changed hands on several occasions since then, it 
remains the largest operator in the telecommunications market in Ireland. 
 The reform agenda in Ireland after 1998 primarily focused on the liberalization 
and opening of domestic markets to competition (ODTR 2000: 2), in line with European 
Union priorities. The second priority of the Union, the harmonization of the conditions of 
access to public telecommunications networks in Member States, was less of a concern. 
Particular focus was given to regulating the conduct of the former monopoly provider 
Eircom and its mobile subsidiary Eircell. However, the Office of the Director of 
Telecommunications Regulation noted that weaknesses in the legislation underpinning its 
work meant that all of its decisions were open to legal challenge (ODTR 2000: 7). 
 As the number of NRAs created by government expanded rapidly during the 
1990s, the then Department of Public Enterprise (which had responsibility for electricity, 
gas, aviation and telecommunications) produced a series of proposals concerned with 
balancing the governance and accountability requirements of regulatory bodies 
(Department of Public Enterprise 2000). In part, the review was also prompted by the 
refusal of the first Director of Telecommunications Regulation to appear before a 
parliamentary committee, citing the absence of a formal requirement in the legislation 
establishing her office for her to do so. One of the main proposals recommended by the 
review was the use of sectoral (rather than industry specific or supra-sectoral) regulators, 
comprised of three persons (‘commissioners’) who would be formally appointed by the 
Minister. This proposal, along with several others contained in the report, was 
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implemented through the Communications Regulation Act of 2002 which established 
ComReg, the successor of the ODTR (below). 
 In April 2002, the EU Council of Ministers adopted a package of legislative 
proposals designed to modernize and harmonize the Community’s legislation on 
electronic communications4. The legislation concerned such issues as Access and 
Interconnection; Universal Service and User Rights, and Data Protection. In Ireland, the 
new EU package was transposed on 25 July 2003. The Irish regulations transposing the 
Directives created a framework of obligations and remedies, an appeals body, and 
enforcement mechanisms for the communications sector.  
 While Ireland is a signatory of the WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement, 
its telecommunications regulation laws in this area have remained primarily based on EU 
Directives as well as national laws (particularly under the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 
1925). This legal framework, within which ComReg operates, is determined by 
Directives of the European Council and Parliament, as well as ‘soft law’ from the 
Commission and the ERG (which has since 2010 become BEREC) (Connery and Hodnett 
2009: 225, 234). Irish law in this field of regulation has remained EU rather than 
domestically derived. 
 
4.4 Regulatees in the current market 
The telecoms infrastructure, wholesale and retail markets in Ireland are dominated by a 
number of large international companies. They include Vodafone, O2, Eircom (STT), ‘3’ 
(Hutchinson Whampoa), BT and UPC. Figure 4.1 below identifies that the incumbent 
Eircom still controls a large portion (almost 2/3) of the market. Figure 4.2, however, 
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identifies that the dominance of Eircom in fixed line infrastructure services continues to 
decline, with a gradual reduction in its market share between 2008 and 2012. 
 
<insert figure4.1 around here> 
 
 
<insert figure4.2 around here> 
 
 
4.5 The Irish telecommunications regulator: ComReg 
The Irish experience of telecoms liberalization had a number of influences. Of course, the 
Ireland was profoundly influenced by the European Union. However, the experience of 
Ireland’s nearest neighbour, Britain, in introducing limited competition, privatization and 
a new regulator (OFTEL) during the 1980s also partly influenced the decision to develop 
an independent regulator for telecommunications in Ireland (Office of the Director of 
Telecommunications Regulation 2000: 1). Once established, the new regulator had to 
establish the nature and scope of its relationship with other actors in the regulatory 
environment, a process to which we turn here. 
 By virtue of the Communications Regulation Act 2002, the Commission for 
Communications Regulation or ComReg was founded on 1 December 2002, taking over 
from the Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation. It has remained as the 
sector regulator for general telecommunications and in performing its core task – the 
regulation of the electronic communications market in Ireland – it mirrors counterparts 
13 
elsewhere in Europe. As will be identified below, however, since its establishment it has 
accumulated a growing number of ancillary tasks. 
 In introducing the legislation founding ComReg, the sponsoring Minister noted in 
the Senate: 
 
It may be asked why we still need such regulation over three years after full 
liberalisation of the sector. The reason is that there are still substantial 
differences in market power between operators and competition could be 
inhibited if there was no regulatory framework in place. Some operators continue 
to be dominant and abuse of that dominant position needs to be prevented. 
(Seanad Éireann 2002, Vol. 169: Col. 988) 
 
 ComReg is a statutory body with its own corporate identity, distinguishing it in 
law from its parent department. One of the principal changes between it and its 
predecessor was in relation to its governing structure. While the ODTR had one person at 
its helm, ComReg is managed by three Commissioners, each appointed by the Minister 
following a public competition. The decision to appoint three Commissioners, according 
to the Minister, was in recognition of the fact that: 
 
The [telecommunications] market is now changing with ever-increasing 
speed…in particular the convergence between telecommunications, broadcasting 
and IT sectors, evolution in technology and changes in user demand. 
(Seanad Éireann 2002, Vol. 169: Col. 990) 
14 
 
 In practice however, the Commissioners did not align with these three sectors. 
Instead, as Figure 4.3 depicts, ComReg consists of four core Divisions (Retail and 
Consumer Services, Wholesale, Market Framework, and Corporate Services) supported 
by a Senior Legal and Senior Economic Advisors. Each Commissioner is appointed for a 
3-5 year period and the role of Chair rotates between them on an annual basis. The Chair 
is in effect primus inter pares and has the casting vote in the event of a tied vote. 
 
<insert figure4.3 around here> 
 
 
 The role of ODTR had encompassed three areas: regulation of the electronic 
communications sector (telecom and broadcasting transmission systems), regulation of 
the postal sector, and management of the radio frequency spectrum.In practice, this work 
entailed such tasks as the development and implementation of a licensing regime for 
telecommunications operators in Ireland (including fixed, mobile and satellite operators); 
supervision of the interconnection regime in Ireland, dispute resolution among operators; 
licensing and regulation of television distribution systems, management and licensing of 
use of the frequency spectrum, and setting price caps on the major operator in the market 
where services were not competitive. 
 Many of ComReg’s core function equate to those of the ODTR. Section 10 of its 
founding Act detailed the functions of ComReg. These included ensuring compliance by 
undertakings with obligations in relation to the supply of and access to electronic 
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communications services, networks and associated facilities, managing the radio 
frequency spectrum, ensuring compliance by providers of postal services with relevant 
obligations, investigating complaints regarding the supply of and access to electronic 
communications services and networks, and compliance in relation to the placing on the 
market of telecommunications equipment. 
 Section 12 of the Act specified the objectives of ComReg in relation to 
telecommunications, namely, the promotion of competition, contributing to the 
development of the internal market, and promoting the interests of users. As well as 
providing and regulating the telecommunications sector, therefore, ComReg must also 
ensure efficient management of the radio frequency spectrum and provide a universal and 
affordable postal service5. In relation to radio frequency spectrum, as a non-landlocked 
and militarily neutral country, Ireland has considerable scope for utilizing its radio 
spectrum for the commercial market. 
 
4.5.1 Development of ComReg’s powers 
In 2007, ComReg’s responsibilities and powers, as well as available enforcement 
measures, were substantially enhanced by the Communications Regulation (Amendment) 
Act 2007.In introducing the legislation, the Minister stated that: 
 
The currentregulatory framework is based on competition law principles and 
aims to ensure fair competition between service providers, some of whom 
dominate for historical structural reasons. However, the evidence to date does not 
show the market to be moving towards a fully competitive state. ComReg’s market 
16 
analyses have found significant market power in both the fixed and mobile 
markets. 
The Bill confers on ComReg competition law powers similar to that of the 
Competition Authority, so that it can investigate and prosecute restrictive 
agreements and practices, but only in regard to the communications sector. 
(Dáil Éireann, Vol. 632: Cols. 743-4, 27 February 2007) 
 
 Significantly, by virtue of the new legislation, ComReg no longer had to wait for 
a complaint of abuse of market dominance to undertake an investigation – it could now 
initiate such investigations itself. But perhaps the most important change in the 2007 
Amendment was the fact that ComReg was granted competition powers in relation to 
electronic communications and services. As with the Competition Authority (below), if 
ComReg believes an undertaking has abused a dominant position, it must prove its case 
in the Courts. The Act therefore allowed the Commission to enforce both Irish and EU 
competition law in respect of issues including abuse of dominance and unsettled 
agreements. 
 Other important changes in the tasks and competences of ComReg arising from 
the 2007 Act included the new requirement to monitor the quality and efficiency of the 
emergency call answering service, the power to collect and disseminate information for 
the purpose of contributing to an open and competitive market, and granting to ComReg 
the power to demand from a person evidence or documents relating to any of the 
Commission’s functions or objectives. Under the 2007 amending Act, ComReg must 
assess the various telecommunications markets in Ireland (as specified by the European 
Commission). Interviews identified that the publication of information on all specified 
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markets annually in order to achieve EU targets had proved to be a very demanding task 
for ComReg. However, it has the power to designate other markets than those specified 
by the Commission. 
 ComReg must take the European Commission’s list of recommended markets and 
define product and geographic markets in accordance with the principles of competition 
law and national circumstance (Connery and Hodnett 2009: 243). Within the defined 
markets, ComReg may impose obligations on operators with Significant Market Power 
(SMP), but it must determine whether SMP exists and competition is therefore 
ineffective. In order to determine which regulatees have Significant Market Power 
(SMP), thresholds are determined by ComReg using a detailed market analysis procedure 
(Goggin 2009). Of particular importance in this process is the notification to the EU and 
other member states. Any subsequent comment following this notification is a formal 
process that contributes to the final decision of ComReg. 
 Interviews suggest that depending on the sensitivity of the issue, the European 
Commission may be notified earlier in the process about a forthcoming issue. Some of 
ComReg’s staff have previously worked in the Commission, and bring to the organisation 
knowledge of the various procedures at EU level as well as contact points. This provides 
a first example of how informality, in this case through involvement in personal 
networks, plays a productive role in achieving a primary function of ComReg. 
 As might be expected, the operator designated as having SMP in several markets 
to date has been Eircom (Connery and Hodnett 2009: 247), though later reviews 
determined that they no longer held SMP in some (for example retail leased lines). Where 
Eircom retained SMP, a variety of remedies have been imposed including allowing 
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competitors access to networks and infrastructure. Other operators such as Vodafone, O2, 
Meteor and 3 have been found to have SMP in markets concerned with mobile phones. 
 In line with EU Directives, ComReg operates an authorisation process for 
Electronic Communications Service and Electronic Communications Network providers 
that is they do not need a full licence to function but must let ComReg know of their 
intention to do so. Once a party has notified ComReg and completed the necessary 
documents, it is deemed to be authorised and added to ComReg’s register of authorised 
undertakings (Connery and Hodnett 2009: 238-9). 
 However, under the Wireless Telegraphy Acts (1926-88), as well as complying 
with the conditions of the general authorisation, mobile phone operators and providers of 
fixed wireless services need to obtain a licence. Licences are normally required by very 
small or local operators such as pleasure craft operating short range radios or university 
radio stations among others. There are some exemptions for such licences, for example 
on aircraft.  
 ComReg is also required to determine the scope of the Universal Service 
Obligation (USO) for the Irish market and decide which undertaking(s) should be 
designated as the Universal Service Provider(s) (USP). In setting its USO obligations, 
ComReg is required to engage in a public consultation concerning the contents of the 
obligations, and the USP in Ireland is required to provide the USO services for a period 
of four years (ComReg 2006). 
 In order to further the various Universal Service Obligations, ComReg has 
developed a number of informal fora for engaging with various stakeholder groups, 
including a Consumer Advisory Panel and a Disabled Users Group. It also offers a 
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number of websites to the public. These include a website which allows users to compare 
tariffs between operators (though interviews identified delays in updating its content to 
reflect changing tariffs and in accurate product comparisons). Another website provides 
consumers with information about making complaints and other general information in 
relation to mobile and land-based telecommunications, post and internet services. 
 
4.5.2 Complaints, Disputes and Mediation 
ComReg receives complaints from the public and from within the telecoms industry. 
There is no single format for submitting complaints, which can take the form of an e-mail 
or submission by a solicitor (Connery and Hodnett 2009: 272-3). ComReg is not bound to 
accept a complaint, and a ‘compliance team’ investigates the validity of complaints and 
assesses the impact on the market in order to allocate and prioritise resources. The 
compliance team can and does also undertake its own investigations. ComReg is obliged 
to keep confidential all information provided to it on that basis and there are statutory 
fines for the disclosure of information without the permission of ComReg to do so. 
 When evaluating the basis for progressing a complaint to an investigation phase, 
ComReg will need to get sufficient information to assess whether there is a potential 
regulatory or competition breach. In practice interviews identify that this is likely to 
require informal dialogue with the complainant unless the submitted complaint is 
comprehensive in terms of the scope and the legal basis. Internal guidelines exist to aid 
the relevant member of compliance team when investigating a complaint that has been 
received externally or one that ComReg has started on its own initiative. The compliance 
function can be considered to cover a number of phases, encompassing a pre-study phase, 
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a feasibility phase, an execution phase (which is subdivided into three stages, 
investigation, compliance and enforcement) and a conclusion phase at which time the 
relevant parties will be informed of the decision. Considerable emphasis has been put on 
transparency in this process with new guidelines and procedures being published in 2010 
following consultations. 
 Where a dispute occurs between two undertakings, ComReg can be requested by 
either party to investigate the dispute with a view to making a determination. Once a 
dispute notice has been received, ComReg decides whether the criteria necessary for a 
dispute submission have been received and on the appropriate course of action as set out 
in its Dispute Resolution Procedures published in 2010. The compliance team (above) are 
also responsible for disputes and the decision is fed back to the parties involved in the 
way of a Final Determination. Failure by an undertaking to comply with a determination 
constitutes an offence. 
 As well as formal dispute resolution procedures, disputes are resolved through 
informal contacts or negotiation; within industry fora or by means of an alternative 
intermediary. ComReg chooses the most appropriate mechanism on a case by case basis 
and bears the costs associated with the provision of any mediation service. If mediation is 
agreed to, ComReg appoints an independent external mediator or ComReg official within 
ten days of that agreement. ComReg can also offer mediation in the case of a cross border 
dispute, where National Regulatory Authorities jointly decide that it would resolve the 
dispute in a timely manner. 
 
4.5.3 ComReg’s autonomy  
21 
The three Commissioners of ComReg are formally appointed and can be dismissed by the 
Minister, but in day to day operational terms are considered to be independent of him/her. 
The Commissioners cannot hold any other office in government, and independence is a 
formal requirement for appointment. A Commissioner can hold office for a maximum of 
two 5-year terms and their remuneration is fixed by the Minister with the consent of the 
Minister for Finance. Also, in order to underline their autonomy, Commissioners do not 
receive an annual bonus from the Minister. 
 To date, the issue of market credibility has been central to the development of 
ComReg and to this end its autonomy has extended to its internal management. It enjoys 
considerable freedom with regards to the management of its personnel, and can make 
individual decisions regarding all management decisions, including appointments and 
terminations. However, it is still bound by general rules regarding personnel management 
decisions, and the embargo on public service recruitment introduced in 2009 and 
subsequent levies on public service pay apply to it.  
 Financial management autonomy is also high: ComReg can freely shift its budget 
allocation within the year, and may take out loans and set tariffs for services or products, 
but is confined by general rules set by the department of Finance for example on issues of 
procurement. Section 29 of the 2002 Act states that ComReg may borrow money but only 
with the consent of both the parent Minister and the Minister for Finance. ComReg’s 
primary source of income comes from spectrum fees, levies and licenses which comes 
directly to them. Such income may exceed the requirements of ComReg and if so it 
makes a contribution to the Exchequer. The relatively high level of managerial autonomy 
enjoyed by ComReg was evident in its awarding of bonuses to senior staff in 2011 (other 
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than Commissioners, and as part of a performance-related pay scheme) when such 
schemes had been suspended in other public organizations6. 
 ComReg has a variety of regulatory instruments at its disposal when carrying out 
its functions and in particular when seeking to address SMP. These include imposing 
obligations of transparency, non-discrimination, access, accounting separation and price 
control (Connery and Hodnett 2009: 247). As in other countries, the most important of its 
regulatory tools are the use of price and tariff regulation, the prior approval of market 
activities by regulatees (as well as the requirement by them to allow network 
interconnection and provide access to infrastructure to other regulates), the achievement 
by regulatees of minimum standards, and adherence to universal service obligations. 
Another core tool in ComReg’s work is the definition of the reserved telecoms market, 
which leaves the remainder open to general competition law. It also places considerable 
weight on the publication of information for consumers. Less emphasis is placed on the 
use of formal competition law, even though it has been provided with such statutory 
powers (and cooperates with the Competition Authority as necessary) and setting 
mandatory standards. It also monitors changes in corporate structure and conduct within 
the market. Investment and maintenance of telecoms infrastructure is also monitored by 
ComReg. 
Alongside these formal expressions of autonomy, however, interviews reveal that 
ComReg also utilizes informal means to pursue its goals. For example, it is in regular 
informal contact (e-mails and telephone calls) with its parent Department, as well as the 
Department of Finance which has an oversight role in respect of all statutory and publicly 
funded organizations. The use of such communications is considered to be integral to the 
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regulator’s work, and has the added benefit of reducing transaction costs and fostering 
trust between actors in the regulatory regime. At no stage is ComReg’s decision-making 
autonomy in question, however. Rather, the interviews suggest that these 
communications help to determine boundaries in the constantly changing regulatory 
environment. 
 
4.5.4 ComReg’s control 
As outlined above, while ComReg enjoys considerable autonomy in the performance of 
its work and internal operations, there are a number of controls to which it is subject and 
which can limit this freedom of action. Many of these are routine. For example, with 
regards to ex ante control, the framework of the goals of the organization is already set in 
its document of establishment, the 2002 Act. Under Section 9 of the 2007 Amendment, 
the Commission also has to produce an Action Plan every year, detailing targets in its 
strategy for the next year. This Action Plan is made after consultation with the 
Department under the authority of the Minister. In the financial area ComReg has an 
Audit Committee, of which a majority of members are external to the organisation. It 
must provide an audit compliance statement with its annual report and is audited by the 
state’s auditor, the Comptroller and Auditor-General. ComReg must also appear before 
relevant parliamentary committees concerning their financial and policy responsibilities 
(though the latter is not considered in a systematic manner by the committees). There is 
no constitutional or legal requirement on a Minister to implement the views of a 
parliamentary committee. 
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 In the area of policy, however, the picture is more complex. In conducting its 
work, Section 12 (4) of the 2002 Act requires ComReg to ‘have regard to policy 
statements, published by or on behalf of the Government or a Minister of the Government 
and notified to the Commission, in relation to the economic and social development of 
the State.’ Thus the absolute autonomy of ComReg can technically be curtailed by its 
parent Minister, though these directions can be subjected to public consultation prior to 
their issue. The Minister must also make his or her intentions known by providing the 
Direction to ComReg and also publishing it. A period of 21 days is provided for 
submissions to be made on the direction. An example of this occurred in 2003 when the 
Minister released a number of policy directions to ComReg, including the introduction of 
flat rate internet access and the provision of monthly progress reports on the delivery of 
such access to customers. However, in practice the Minister tends not to issue them and 
there is only one other occasion in which it has occurred. This was in 2004 when a 
package of directions concerning network roaming, pricing and interconnection were 
issued. The legislation prevents the Minister from making any directions in respect of 
individuals or individual undertakings. 
 Though ex ante control is thus limited, it must be emphasised that the legislative 
mandate of ComReg, as a state agency, can at any time be amended by the Government. 
Indeed Gorecki (2011) argues that recent initiatives by the Irish government in 2010 to 
seek more accountability, transparency and performance assessments from regulators, as 
well as greater political input into decisions and priorities, runs counter to the dynamic of 
regulatory autonomy and poses a threat to the independence of regulators. He argues that 
any new legislation that seeks to co-ordinate the work of regulators in order to achieve 
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national economic goals requires carefully balancing the means to achieve such goals 
with the current statutory mandates of the regulators. He proposes that while some of 
these developments may indeed enhance the regulatory regime in Ireland, they may 
alternatively present conflicting demands on regulators, lead to over-emphasis on short-
term rather than long-term goals, and ultimately raise uncertainty in those market sectors 
where certainty is an integral part of development. The Programme for Government of 
the administration that took office early in 2011 also issued intentions in relation to 
ComReg’s decision-making, stating that in relation to liberalization of postal services, it 
would: 
 
[…] protect universal service obligation by assigning it to An Post for at least 20 
years, make provision for state subvention and require that any decision by 
ComReg to reassign or scrap USO is subject to ministerial approval. 
(Government of Ireland 2011). 
 
 Ex post, there are several devices in which both the overall functioning and 
specific decisions of ComReg can be reviewed. Section 6 of the 2007 Amendment states 
that the Minister can request information from ComReg concerning the technical 
operation or performance of electronic communications networks and infrastructures in 
the State. Also, the Minister meets with Commissioners every one-two months to discuss 
goals (see below). These are formal and high-level meetings. However they are 
supplemented by more frequent formal and informal interactions at a lower level that is 
between departmental officials and the staff of ComReg. As with other informal 
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communications identified above, such meetings act as a means to supplement the formal 
mechanisms in place in order to achieve specific goals. 
 Appeals against ComReg decisions are not made by another regulator. Instead, 
they are taken by operators who appeal in the first instance to the Commercial Division 
of the Court, also known as the Commercial Court. In relation to such appeals by 
operators, there have been several incidents which resulted in operators taking legal 
action. Two cases which ended up in the Supreme Court achieved particular prominence. 
The first concerned the awarding of the third GSM licence to Meteor in 1998. The award 
was unsuccessfully challenged in the Irish High Court and Supreme Court by the losing 
party Orange and it was not until 2001 that Meteor began operating. The second case 
arose in 2008 when Eircom lodged an appeal with the Irish High Court against a decision 
by ComReg to cut the cost of line sharing in a bid to make its local loop network more 
competitive for other operators. This case was significant as Eircom argued that it had no 
right of appeal in a case where it was directed by ComReg to do something that could not 
be undone within the period available for an appeal. They argued that the decision of 
ComReg was in contravention of Article 4 of the Framework Directive which set out an 
unqualified right of appeal (Connery and Hodnett 2009: 473). The case was won by 
Eircom. 
 Interviews suggest that telecoms operators have engaged in strategic behaviour 
when deciding on whether or not to pursue legal appeals against decisions of ComReg. It 
was also suggested that the duration of court cases are taken into account. These tend to 
take between 6 months and a year to resolve, though in some cases they have lasted 
longer than a year.  Strategic behaviour by regulatees is not new in the telecoms sector.  
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Indeed, when ComReg’s predecessor the ODTR was first established, any appeals filed 
by regulatees to it meant automatic suspension of any related decisions, and it required a 
change in the law in 2001 to ensure that decisions were no longer suspended on appeal. 
 It is also the case that ComReg has no power to levy significant administrative 
fines, powers which most other EU regulators have.  ComReg therefore faces a choice of 
imposing very small fines or else pursuing a matter further through the courts with a view 
to demanding higher fines, with no guarantee of success. 
 
 
4.6 Formal and informal interactions in the regulatory arrangement 
Having considered in some detail the role, autonomy and control of the principal actor in 
the Irish telecoms regulatory arrangement, we turn here to consider the other actors - The 
Competition Authority, the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, the Department of 
Communications, Energy and Natural Resources and the Courts (see figure 4.4). In each 
case their formal role is described and then their relationship with ComReg. Again, we 
find that in almost all cases, informal as well as formal communications and processes 
form an important part of these relationships. 
 
<insert figure4.4 around here> 
 
 
4.6.1 The Competition Authority 
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The Competition Authority (TCA) was established in 1991 to enforce general EU and 
Irish competition law, to review large mergers, and promote competition within the Irish 
economy. It therefore has jurisdiction in relation to the telecommunications market and 
the application of competition law within it. Its relationship with ComReg has developed 
from being a largely informal one to one described in law. Currently, both TCA and 
ComReg are jointly responsible for administering and enforcing the Competition Act 
2002 in the electronic Communications sector, as specified in the Communications 
Regulation (Amendment) Act 2007. This formal sharing of co-competition powers in the 
sector emerged in order to resolve issues of overlapping jurisdictions between both 
regulators (below). 
 TCA has a single chairperson formally appointed by the Minister (following a 
selection process), and its legislation specifies a list of grounds under which the Minister 
can remove him/her from office. The chairperson, along with their directors, forms the 
management Board of TCA. This group has decision-making (as opposed to advisory) 
functions and has the authority to impose fines (though this authority has never been 
tested in the courts)7. While TCA is independent of the Department in carrying out its 
functions, the Minister retains certain powers, including the right to direct TCA to carry 
out a study. Also, media mergers require the approval of the Minister. 
 The work of TCA is determined by its 3-year strategy statement and its related 
annual business plans. These documents are forwarded to the Minister but the Authority 
retains the autonomy to formulate its own goals and evaluates its own performance. 
There are no formal reporting requirements although the Authority appears before and is 
accountable to parliamentary committees. 
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 When the ODTR was created in 1997, there was no statutory provision for 
interaction or co-operation between the two organisations. Both had obligations in 
relation to protecting commercially confidential information and in the absence of a legal 
framework for such, no information could be exchanged. However, at an informal level, 
the ODTR and the Competition Authority met regularly to discuss issues of general 
interest and common concern. The development of this informal relationship was 
augmented by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two offices. 
In the development of new competition legislation in 2002, provision was made for 
formalising the relationship between the two regulators. Specifically, it obliged the 
Competition Authority to enter into co-operation agreements with a number of NRAs. 
These agreements were to focus on facilitating co-operation and confidential information 
exchange, as well as to avoid duplication of efforts. 
 In 2002, ComReg and the Competition Authority signed a ‘co-operation 
agreement’ to facilitate co-operation, avoid duplication of activities and ensure, as far as 
practicable, consistency between decisions made or other steps taken by the parties 
relating to competition between undertakings in the telecoms market. While the 
agreement was a first step in providing for greater co-operation, amending legislation 
allowed the opportunity to put the relationship on a statutory footing. In 2007, the 
Communications Regulation (Amendment) Act 2007 (see above) came into force and as 
well as granting ComReg some competition powers, it set out when and how ComReg 
and the Competition Authority should co-operate. As well as this formal requirement for 
interaction, however, informal communications and contacts are still an essential part of 
the relationship between ComReg and TCA. 
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4.6.2 Broadcasting Authority of Ireland 
In Ireland, radio and television broadcasting content is regulated by the Broadcasting 
Authority of Ireland (BAI) which was established in October 2009. The BAI took over 
the functions of its predecessor the Broadcasting Commission of Ireland, as well as the 
functions of the Broadcasting Complaints Commission and certain self-regulating powers 
of the governance boards of the national broadcasters Radio Telefís Éireann and Téilifis 
na Gaeilge (an Irish language television station). The BAI has a CEO appointed by a 
Board, after consultation with the Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural 
Resources. The objectives of the BAI include ensuring variety in the categories of 
broadcasting services available and ensuring rights of expression are upheld. Amongst 
the BAI’s powers is the ability to fine broadcasters for contract breaches rather than 
necessarily removing their contracts. 
 The BAI is required to consult with the Minister and its parent Department on a 
regular basis, and as well as its founding legislation it has a strategic plan approved by 
the Department and Minister on which its work is based. Goals are therefore set after 
consultation with the Department, which also evaluates the work of the BAI. It reports on 
its work each trimester. As with the case of ComReg, under its founding legislation, the 
Minister ‘may issue such policy communications to the Authority as he or she considers 
appropriate to be followed by the Authority in the performance of its functions’ and the 
Authority must take these into consideration when making its decisions (Broadcasting 
Act 2009: Section 30). BAI is funded primarily through funds from regulatees, but also in 
return for services rendered and through some minor commercial activity. 
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 Under Section 26 of the 2009 Act, one of the principal functions of the BAI is to 
‘liaise and consult with the Communications Regulator in the preparation of the 
allocation plan for the frequency range dedicated to sound and television broadcasting’. 
Technological innovation and convergence in relation to audiovisual content have also 
placed pressures on the broadcasting sector. As ComReg has responsibility for managing 
radio spectrum, there is a formal relationship between BAI and ComReg in relation to the 
granting of licences for commercial broadcasting. With the increased convergence of 
telecom and broadcasting technologies, ComReg’s engagement with the BAI has become 
increasingly important. Survey information obtained for the development of this chapter 
identify that again ComReg engages in regular informal communications with BAI, and 
that this level of communication has increased to almost a daily basis. In late 2011 the 
new administration announced its desire to merge ComReg with BAI as part of a wider 
programme of state agency reform. 
 
4.6.3 Department and Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural 
Resources 
The Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources is one of 
sixteencurrent government departments, each of which is headed by a Minister. As noted 
above, as each Minister is constitutionally and legally responsible for the activities of his 
or her department, and all activities of the department are conducted in the name of the 
Minister, there is rarely policy divergence between the Minister and his/her Department; 
the Minister is the decision-maker. The most senior civil servant in each Department is 
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the Secretary-General, who works closely with the Minister and who has particular 
responsibility for the proper management of financial affairs in the Department. 
 The Minister is also responsible to parliament for any agencies or offices under 
the aegis of his/her Department, and state funding for such organizations normally comes 
through the Department, who also audit and oversee their work. Apart from corporate 
units, the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources has a number 
of operational sections. The Communications Section is the main point of contact for 
ComReg (though it also communicates regularly with the Broadcasting Section). The key 
role of this section is the development of effective policies for the regulation of the 
electronic communications sector, and management of the radio frequency spectrum. 
Responsibility for the implementation of policies rests with ComReg which, as detailed 
above, is normally independent in the exercise of its regulatory functions. 
 As noted above, ComReg’s Commissioners meet with the Minister several times 
annually to discuss any and all matters within ComReg’s remit. These meetings, as well 
as its appearances before Oireachtas committees (which also occur on several occasions 
during the year) are of central importance to its work. Rather than a form of evaluation or 
assessment of performance, these meetings tend to be concerned with planning future 
policy direction and objectives. Interviews recognise the important role played by the 
Minister (and the Government generally) in setting ComReg’s policy agenda, and the 
requirement to have a strategy statement every two years combined with annual action 
plans and budgets means that communications with the Department are necessarily 
frequent. Informally, these meetings may be considered a form of strategy statement 
review but they are not evaluations. Other meetings occasionally take place as necessary 
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(normally several times per year) between ComReg and Ministers and officials from 
‘central’ Departments (Finance and Taoiseach, and since 2011 the Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform), and also with other regulators such as the Competition 
Authority and the National Consumer Agency. 
 In terms of ComReg’s ability to influence policy making within its parent 
Department, interviews suggest that this is largely an informal process. In particular, the 
technical nature of much of telecommunications policy means that the Department seeks 
and receives the assistance of ComReg when developing its policy and will be guided by 
ComReg’s opinion on best practice in relation to such matters as availability, quality of 
service and other standard setting. ComReg is not statutorily required to do so. There are 
number of areas - such as the allocation of radio frequency spectrum - where ComReg 
has the necessary mandatory powers and does not require Departmental approval. Also, 
while responsibility for the transposition of EU Directives and Regulations pertinent to 
telecommunications formally lies with the Department, interviews identify that ComReg 
assists it in its determination as to whether transposition must be conducted through 
primary or secondary legislation (the latter being less onerous). A member of staff in 
ComReg has responsibility for monitoring the transposition process to ensure that Ireland 
and ComReg is compliant with EU law, and is in regular communication with the 
Department. ComReg also assists the Department in its engagement on 
telecommunications policy at various EU fora (below). 
 
4.6.4 The Courts 
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The Irish Constitution provides that ‘justice shall be administered in courts established by 
law’. Apart from the courts of local and limited jurisdiction (the District and Circuit 
courts), the State’s two superior Courts of Appeal are the High Court and the Supreme 
Court. Due to the growing number of cases relating to commercial law, a Commercial 
Court was initiated in 2004. It operates as a separate division within the High Court, thus 
reducing the burden of work within that court. Almost all cases concerning telecoms and 
telecoms regulation are now dealt with by the Commercial Court. There is no telecoms 
Ombudsman in Ireland. As noted above, a number of high profile cases have been 
decided by the Courts. 
 The 2002 Regulatory Framework also required all Member States to have an 
effective appeals mechanism. In 2003, and following EU requirements for an appeals 
forum, a three-person quasi-judicial Electronic Communications Appeals Panel (ECAP) 
was created in Ireland to allow operators appeal ComReg decisions. Decisions by ECAP 
could be further appealed to the Irish Courts and the European Court of Justice. In 
practice, the proliferation of appeals against regulatory decisions, delays in hearing them, 
and the decision of operators to bring decisions of ECAP to the courts led to its 
abandonment as a mechanism in 2007. ComReg supported this decision but interviews 
suggest that some major operators did not. A review of the regulatory environment in 
Ireland published in 2009 noted that the decision to abolish ECAP was perhaps 
questionable given that it had heard only two substantive cases (Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2009: 130). 
 The current mechanism for appeals against decisions by ComReg is therefore the 
High Court8 (or more specifically the Commercial Court which hears the commercial 
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cases appealed to that Court), and a subsequent appeal may be lodged with the Supreme 
Court. Interviews suggest that ComReg normally appears in the Commercial Court 4-5 
times per year, though the costs of doing so can vary considerably. The European Court 
of Justice is a final avenue of appeal for operators9. Interviews also suggest that ComReg 
uses its remit and influence to try and resolve disputes between regulators as well as to 
avoid disputes reaching the Courts. As a result, a number of cases have avoided full 
judicial proceedings. There is no evidence that informality plays a part in ComReg’s 
relationship with the Courts. 
 
4.6.5 ComReg and its Regulatees 
To complete the picture of the Irish telecoms regulatory arrangement, it is important to 
note the various fora through which ComReg communicates with regulatees and EU 
actors. ComReg routinely meets with a body known as the Telecommunications and 
Internet Federation (TIF), which is a sub-committee of a large interest group known as the 
Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC). The TIF represents operators 
working in the field of electronic communications. While these meetings provide an 
opportunity to engage on matters of concern to the sector, ComReg’s Commissioners also 
meet with the CEOs of individual undertakings to discuss concerns. 
 In relation to regulatee or industry ‘capture’, ComReg seeks to avoid capture by 
the industry (producer) rather than the consumer, or by any individual producer in the 
sector. In relation to the first dimension, ComReg has initiated a Consumer Advisory 
Panel and conducts regular consumer surveys. ComReg monitors calls to its customer 
call centre to identify what the changing trends are in the market. In relation to capture by 
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any one regulatee, and in particular the incumbent, ComReg meets regularly with another 
umbrella organisation known as the Alternative Operators in the Communications Market 
(ALTO)10 and the European Competitive Telecommunications Association (ECTA). As 
required by the EU regulatory framework, ComReg insists it is ‘technology neutral’ in 
relation to service development. Interviews confirm that ComReg has traditionally met 
most frequently with Eircom, and mainly to discuss USO-related issues, but this is 
largely due to the fact that as the incumbent operator, it has more obligations to fulfil in 
the market than other operators. 
 Rather than adopting formal regulation in all cases, ComReg has on occassion 
sought to encourage voluntary changes in behaviour by regulatees in some aspects of the 
market. A prominent example of this occurred in respect of mobile termination rates, 
where, prior to the European Commission’s issuance of a Termiantion Rate 
Recommendation in 2009 to be followed by national regulators, ComReg had negotiated 
voluntary reductions in charges between operators. The Commission issues their 
Recommendation out of concern that a common EU approach to the matter was not 
emerging. 
 
4.6.6 ComReg and the EU 
ComReg’s engagement with the institutions of the EU is similar to that of other country 
case-studies presented in this volume, and it engages directly with various EU regulatory 
fora several times per year. For the purposes of its work, its engagements with the 
Commission, the IRG/ERG and the Radio Spectrum Policy Group are particularly 
important. These meetings are usually concerned with data exchange and agreement on 
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common policy positions. Of increasing importance is its input to the Body of European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC). It also meets with the European 
Telecommunications Network Operators Association (ETNO), ECTA and the 
Confederation of European Posts and Telecommunications (CEPT) several times per 
year. In relation to the EU’s Communications Committee (Cocom), Ireland is represented 
by the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources but informally, 
ComReg assists the Department in the performance of this role. Similarly, ComReg is 
able to indirectly feed into meetings of the Council via its parent Department, to whom it 
presents informal consultation on relevant matters that arise. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
The examination presented here has focused on the work of the main sectoral regulator – 
ComReg – within the Irish telecommunications regulatory arrangement. In pursuing its 
mandate and engaging with a wide variety of stakeholders, the study identifies the 
importance of informal as well as formal relationships and practices. From the use of 
personal contacts at the EU level, to regular informal communications with other NRAs 
and its parent Department, to establishing non-statutory fora with stakeholders, ComReg 
has sought to deploy ‘softer’ forms of influence to supplement its formal requirements 
and statutory powers. This presents the Irish case in contrast to the other country studies 
presented here, where there are more complex formal relationships and modes of 
communication within the regulatory environment. 
 Returning to the two-dimensional conception of informality adopted at the 
beginning of the chapter - the use of discretion in the implementation of policy, and the 
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engagement of actors in non-formal (but rule-bound) networks and communications - the 
Table below identifies how these are manifested in the Irish case by drawing on the 
findings above. 
 
<insert table4.1 around here> 
 
 In all cases, the use of informality does not undermine or supplant the formal 
modes of operation and communication. Rather, it supplements them by determining 
respective roles and responsibilities within what one interviewee referred to as the 
regulator’s ‘legislative tramlines’. Thus while informality may not be institutionalized in 
the sense of offering an alternative to formal regulatory rules, it can instead be viewed as 
complementary to the statutory framework. 
 It is not surprising of course that a regulatory authority would employ discretion 
in the pursuit of its mandate, but the engagement in non-formal networks and 
communications is quite extensive and in keeping with a core feature of Irish 
administrative culture. Of particular interest is the development of the relationship 
between ComReg and the Competition Authority, which involved previously informal 
practices and procedures later becoming formalized in law. However informal 
communications between the two actors remain important in regulating of that market 
sector. 
 The engagement of ComReg is multiple and various networks (including those 
they have deliberately created) supports strongly Hood’s concept of Nodality as 
identified in the introduction as a means of achieving tasks. It also fits with Ayres and 
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Braithwaite’s concept of negotiated modes of regulation which are contrasted with more 
adversarial and litigious forms of regulatory enforcement. In the Irish case, we find that 
ComReg’s use of informal communications in the mediation of disputes and conflicts has 
been important for the development of the Irish regulatory regime by establishing 
boundaries where they have not been formally delineated. Understanding the de facto 
independence of the regulator in the Irish telecoms regulatory arrangement therefore 
requires moving beyond formal frameworks and rules to recognising the role played by 
non-formal and informal activities. 
 In conclusion, the convergence of technologies in the broadcasting, media and 
telecommunications arenas, as well as the desire to Irish governments to rationalize 
structures and practices within the bureaucracy as a response to the financial crisis will 
ensure that the regulatory arrangement for telecoms will continue to evolve. The 
proposed merger of ComReg and BAI will also alter the shape of the regulatory regime. 
EU pressures for greater harmonization in telecommunications policy within the single 
market (as part of the Digital 2020 initiative), as well on-going exchanges between 
national regulators through BEREC, will undoubtedly promote standardization in 
practices. Also, the enduring dominance of incumbent operators and SMP in a number of 
telecoms markets determines the need for robust national regulatory regimes. The extent 
to which these pressures will encourage or reduce the use of informal practices and 
networks of engagement within the Irish case remains to be seen and should provide the 
basis for fruitful future analysis. 
